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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BECKY SUE MYERS, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
TRACY LYNN MYERS, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
District Court No. 064400347 
Appellate No. 20080911 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce, of the Utah Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah 
County, the Honorable Samuel McVey presiding. Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is 
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
78A-4-103(2)(h) (1953 as amended) and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court err when it found that Petitioner was cohabitating and 
terminated Respondent's obligation to pay further alimony, when Petitioner did not have 
a common residency with another or sexual contact with another? 
1 
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Standard of Review: "Whether cohabitation exists 'is a mixed question of fact 
and law. While we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are shown to be 
clearly erroneous, we review its ultimate conclusion for correctness.5" Jensen v. Jensen, 
2007 UT App 377, If 2, 173 P.3d 223 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), quoting Pendleton v. 
Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). See also Haddow v. Haddow, 707 
P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985) ("the determination of whether given circumstances constitute 
cohabitation requires the application of the terms of a court order to a given set of facts. 
This process is in reality a mixed question of fact and law, and we are not bound by the 
conclusion reached by the trial court.5') Because this is an appeal of the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law/ultimate conclusion of the trial court, the issue presented on 
appeal was preserved via timely filing of the Notice of Appeal R, at 200-199. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules are relevant to this 
appeal: 
Statutes: 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) and (10) (1953 as 
amended): 
\\ 
(8)(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes 
and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
2 
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Rules: 
1. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9): 
A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties in this matter were divorced in June of 2006. R at 188: 1,] As part of 
the Decree of Divorce, Petitioner, Becky Sue Myers ("Petitioner"), was awarded 
alimony. R. at 188-187: 2, 
Respondent, Tracy Lynn Myers ("Respondent") filed a Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce on January 31,2008. R at 94-92. In that Petition, Respondent alleged that 
Petitioner was cohabitating, further, that Respondent could no longer pay alimony, and 
that alimony should be terminated. R. at 94: 3,4 and 93: 5. On April 30, 2008, 
Petitioner filed her Verified Answer to Respondent's Petition to Modify Divorce Decree, 
denying the allegations. R. at 146-142. 
A bench trial was held in regard to this matter on July 1, 2008, before the 
Honorable Samuel McVey. R. at 176. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
were signed and entered on October 6, 2008. R. at 188-184. An Order Modifying 
Decree of Divorce was signed and entered on Octobbr 6, 2008. R. at 191-192. In 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court stated in its 
1
 There will be two separate citations to the Record on Appeal in this Brief. The court 
record of pleadings and papers shall be referred to as "R. page number." The Transcript 
of Proceedings shall be referred to as "Tr. page number." 
3 
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conclusions that "[p]ursuant to Section 30-3-5(10), an order for alimony in this 
case terminates upon establishment by the Respondent that Petitioner is 
cohabitating with another person." R. at 184:6. This conclusion was based in part 
on the following: 
14. Petitioner's parents tried to control Mike Hart and prevent 
any sexual relationship involving Mike Hart. However, they 
were unable to control him and prevent such contact 
between Mr. Hart and the Petitioner. 
16. There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike 
Hart, which the Court infers from the common residency of 
the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is corroborated by 
the evidence that Petitioner elected to spend the night with 
Mike Hart in Salt Lake City. 
17. The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the 
Court indicates that Petitioner and Mike Hart had a sexual 
relationship. 
R. at 186: 14 & 16, 185: 16, 17. 
As a result, the trial court ordered that "Respondent's obligation to pay Petitioner 
alimony is terminated in this case, effective January 31, 2008/' R» at 192: 1. This appeal 
followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were divorced in June of 2006. R-at 188:1. Following the divorce, 
Petitioner moved in with her parents in or around the Spring of 2007. R. at 187:3. While 
living at her parents' house, Petitioner slept on a couch. Tr. at 12: 24. Petitioner's 
parents allow foster boys to live with them in the home, and did during the period that 
Petitioner was staying with her parents. Tr. at 128: 17-19. At the time, a foster child 
4 
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named Michael Hart wras staying at the residence, Tr. at 127: 2-4 and 132: 15. While 
staying there, Mr. Hart had a room that he stayed in with another foster child. Tr. at 107: 
4-7. Respondent alleged that Appellant cohabitated with Mr. Hart, having sexual contact 
and sharing a common residence with him. R. at 93: 5. 
At the conclusion of proceedings, the trial court determined that Petitioner and Mr. 
Hart were sharing a common residence and had a sexual relationship. R, at 186:16 and 
185:16. Alimony was terminated effective January 31,2008. R. at 192:1. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
The trial court's determination to terminate Petitioner's right to alimony from 
Respondent should be reversed because Petitioner was not cohabitating. Cohabitation 
requires (1) common residency and (2) sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association. 
The standard of review clearly states that whether cohabitation exists is a mixed question 
of fact and law. Specifically, the factual findings of the trial court are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard, while the ultimate conclusion of the trial court is reviewed for 
correctness. ° \ 
First, the trial court's ultimate conclusion that Petitioner and Michael Hart shared 
a common residency is incorrect. There was no evidence presented that Petitioner and 
Mr. Hart shared living expenses, that Petitioner had free access to Mr. Hart's living 
quarters, or that Petitioner ate meals regularly with Mr. Hart, shared food expenses with 
him or kept clothing or other personal items in his living quarters. The only evidence 
5 
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regarding a common residency was that the two shared the same address for 
approximately four months. This type of living arrangement is more akin to that of a 
boarding house or basement tenant, where the tenants may share the same physical 
address, but are not cohabitating. Therefore, the trial court's ultimate conclusion in 
regard to a common residency should be reversed. 
Second, the trial court's findings in regard to sexual contact between Petitioner 
and Mr. Hart were clearly erroneous, and as a result, the trial court's ultimate conclusion 
in this regard was also incorrect. There was no direct evidence presented to the trial court 
showing sexual contact, or that Petitioner and Mr. Hart kissed, hugged or even held 
hands. In fact, the trial court's findings at one point state that the trial court was inferring 
a sexual relationship existed. The nature of this finding is problematic when viewing 
other cases where cohabitation was found to exist. Specifically, in those matters sexual 
contact was generally admitted to or the evidence was clear and direct that there was 
sexual contact. Therefore, the trial court's findings in this regard were clearly erroneous. 
Finally, because of the erroneous findings, the trial court's ultimate conclusion in regard 
to sexual contact was incorrect. ^: 
Therefore, the trial court's ruling that Petitioner cohabitated and was no longer 
entitled to alimony from Respondent should be reversed. 
6 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT PETITIONER WAS 
COHABITATING AND NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ALIMONY 
SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
The trial court in this matter determined incorrectly that it was appropriate to 
terminate Petitioner's right to receive alimony from Respondent. R, at 192: 1. In making 
this determination, the trial court concluded that "[fjhere was a sexual relationship 
between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which the Court infers from the common residency of 
the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner 
elected to spend the night with Mike Hart in Salt Lake City." R. 186485:16. Further, 
that "Petitioner and Mike Hart had a common residency." R. at 185: 3. The applicable 
standard of review instructs "[w]hether cohabitation exists 'is a mixed question of fact 
and law. While we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are shown to be 
clearly erroneous, we review its ultimate conclusion for correctness."5 Jensen v. Jensen, 
2007 UT App 377, f 2, 173 P.3d 223, quoting Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996); See also Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985) ("the 
determination of whether given circumstances constitute cohabitation requires the 
application of the terms of a court order to a given set of facts. This process is in reality a 
mixed question of fact and law, and we are not bound by the conclusion reached by the 
trial court.") 
Cohabitation requires "(1) common residency and (2) sexual contact evidencing a 
conjugal association." Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160, n.l. Under the above standard and 
7 
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this definition, the trial court's ultimate conclusions must be reversed. Specifically, the 
facts simply do not support a determination that Petitioner was truly "cohabitating with 
another person." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10). First, the evidence does not support the 
trial court's ultimate conclusion that there was a common residence between Petitioner 
and Mr. Hart. Second, the trial court's findings and its ultimate conclusion that there was 
a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mr. Hart were also incorrect. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S ULTIMATE DETERMINATION THAT 
PETITIONER SHARED A COMMON RESIDENCE WITH ANOTHER 
WAS INCORRECT, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Cohabitation requires "(1) common residency and (2) sexual contact evidencing a 
conjugal association." Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160, n.l. Common residency is 
defined as requiring "the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their 
principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time." Haddow, 707 P.2d 
at 672. Further, common residency "implies continuity, not simply a habit of visiting or a 
sojourn." Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160. While the definition appears simple, the factors 
that should be considered in reaching that conclusion complicate the inquiry. The 
reviewing courts in Utah have had opportunities to review the determinations of trial 
courts regarding whether or not a particular individual is sharing a common residency 
with another. By considering the underlying determinative facts in the most relevant 
cases, when compared to the present matter, it is clear that the trial court's ultimate 
conclusion in regard to common residency was incorrect and should be reversed. 
8 
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1. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER SHARED 
LIVING EXPENSES WITH MR. HART. 
While it is not dispositive of whether or not a common residence is shared, the 
sharing of living expenses is a relevant factor that should be considered. See Haddow, 
707 P.2d at 673-674. In this case, there was no evidence of any sharing of living 
expenses between Petitioner and Mr. Hart. In Haddow, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that "[although we do not consider the sharing of the financial obligations surrounding 
the maintenance of a household to be a requisite element of cohabitation, we do find it 
significant that Mr. Hudson did not pay any of appellant's living expenses or consistently 
share with her any of his assets.5' Id. at 673. Further, "Mr. Hudson did not contribute 
anything to appellant's mortgage payments, the insurance on her house, or her utility 
bills/' Id. at 673-4. Ultimately, the Court determined that there was not a common 
residency present. Id, In Pendleton, the Utah Court of Appeals confirmed that the 
sharing of living expenses is an important, though not dispositive factor, stating 
"[ajlthough neither the presence of portable possessions nor the sharing of living 
expenses is dispositive, either may nonetheless be indicative of maintaining a shared 
household and be regarded as some evidence of residency." 918 P.2d at 160. Also, 
"[f]or example, while it is not important if the two sliare assets in a general sense, it may 
indeed be relevant if one party pays the other's mortgage, the insurance on his or her 
house, or the utility bills-actions which would be quite atypical for a mere visitor, even a 
regular and frequent visitor." Id. at 160-1. In Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals found 
that, amongst other factors, the lack of shared expenses was relevant, finding "[t]he 
9 
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evidence does not indicate that Wife shared living or food expenses with Mr. Andrews." 
2007 UT App. 377, f 3. The Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the trial court's 
determination that there was not a shared residence. Id, Finally, in Sigg v. Sigg, the Utah 
Court of Appeals found the following to be relevant indicators of a common residency: 
The two had a sexual relationship, shared living expenses, had open access 
to each other's condominiums, ate together and shared food expenses, kept 
clothing in the same condominium, used the same furniture and 'otherwise 
lived as though they were husband and wife.' 
905 P.2d 908, 918 (Utah Ct App. 1995) (emphasis added). 
There was no evidence submitted to the trial court indicating that Petitioner shared 
living expenses with Mr. Hart. In fact, quite the opposite was true. Rather than receiving 
financial help from Mr. Hart, the testimony at trial indicated that Petitioner's living 
situation was somewhat bleak; she had even resigned herself to living at her parents' 
home on the couch. See Tr. at 12:24,106:1-2 and 107:1-3. Further, even in the findings 
of fact, the only finding of that trial court that would even remotely indicate any sharing 
of living expenses was the statement that "Petitioner was seen in a familial relationship, 
paired up with Mike H a r t . . . . " R. at 186:13. Again, while it is true that the sharing of 
living expenses is not dispositive, it is a factor that the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah 
Court of Appeals have considered important and placed emphasis on in reaching the 
ultimate conclusion of whether or not an individual is sharing a common residence with 
another. Therefore, it should be considered relevant that Petitioner was never found to be 
sharing living or other expenses with Mr. Hart. 
10 
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2. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER AND MR. 
HART HAD ACCESS TO EACH OTHER'S LIVING QUARTERS IN 
THE RESIDENCE, 
It is also relevant that neither Petitioner nor Mr. Hart had access to the other's 
living quarters in the residence. In Pendleton, where the Utah Court of Appeals did find 
a common residency, it was relevant that the boyfriend "had his own key to Joyce's 
home/' that "he came and went from Joyce's home three to four times daily, even when 
she was not there." 918 P.2d at 161 _ The Utah Supreme Court also found a common 
residency in Sigg, where despite the fact that a couple had "separate condominiums in the 
same condominium complex," they had "open access to each other's condominiums." 
905 P.2d at 917-918. Consider also Haddow, a case where common residency was found 
not to exist, where the Utah Supreme Court found the following: 
The trial court made no finding that Mr. Hudson either spent any time at the 
home when appellant was not there or had a key to the house. These 
circumstances seem particularly significant on the question of whether Mr. 
Hudson was living with appellant, since a resident will come and go as he 
pleases in his own home, while a visitor, however regular and frequent, will 
schedule his visits to coincide with the presence of the person he is visiting. 
707 P.2d at 673. Finally, in Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals found a common 
residency did not exist where the Respondent did not have "open access to the 
Andrewses' home." 2007 UT App. 377, ^ 3. The facts in that case indicated that "Wife 
lived in the same residence as Mr. Andrews off and on for two months, sharing a 
bedroom with Mr. Andrews's sister." Id. at f 2. Further, that "Wife did not have a key to 
the Andrewses' home, had only some of her clothing and toiletries with her during her 
stay." Id. at % 3. 
11 
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This case presents a unique fact pattern. The evidence presented indicated that 
while Petitioner and Mr. Hart were staying in the same residence, they maintained 
separate living quarters. See R. at 186: 9; Tr. at 12:24, 106:1-2 & 17-23, and 107:1-7. 
Specifically, Petitioner would stay on the couch while Mr. Hart had his own room, which 
was shared with a roommate. See R. at 186: 9; Tr, at 12:24, 106:1-2 & 17-23, and 107:1-
7. What is significant under these facts is that Petitioner did not have open or unfettered 
access to Mr. Hart's living area. While there was some evidence that Petitioner was 
found sleeping in the same room with Mr. Hart, while he was on the floor and she was on 
the couch, this was not a bedroom, but rather a common area. Tr. at 103:25; 104: 1-2; 
and 107: 8-11. But of particular importance was the lack of evidence that Petitioner 
would frequent Mr. Hart's living area, or room, when he was not there. While it could be 
argued that perhaps Mr. Hart had open access to Petitioner's "living area" it was not at 
the exclusion of others. It was simply a product of the fact that Petitioner was staying in 
a common area of the residence. This situation should be viewed as being one similar to 
a boarding house arrangement, or to that of an individual living in a basement apartment. 
While the tenants in the boarding house, or the tenant in a basement apartment, may share 
the same physical residence or address, the living quarters are separate and distinct from 
each other. 
In Jensen, while not exactly the same fact pattern existed, it is significant that the 
party in that case was found not to share a common residence with her boyfriend even 
though she stayed at her boyfriend's residence "off and on for two months," and shared 
12 
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"a bedroom with Mr. Andrews's sister." 2007 UT App. 377, f 2. Similarly here, while 
Petitioner was staying at the same residence, she and Mr. Hart maintained separate living 
arrangements. See R. at 186: 9; Tr. at 12:24, 106:1-2 & 17-23, and 107:1-7. Finally, as 
was noted above, the Utah Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Utah have found it 
significant if a cohabitating individual had a key to another's residence. See Pendleton, 
918 P,2d at 161; Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673; SUgg, 905 P.2d at 917-918; and Jensen, 2007 
UT App. 377, If 3. While Petitioner may have had open access to the residence, she did 
not have open access to Mr. Hart's room. This should be considered the same situation 
as an individual lacking a key, or access, to another's residence. 
3, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER ATE REGULARLY 
WITH MR. HART, SHARED FOOD EXPENSES, OR KEPT CLOTHING 
OR OTHER PERSONAL ITEMS IN HIS ROOM. 
There was also an absence of evidence indicating that Petitioner took meals 
regularly with Mr. Hart, shared food expenses or kept clothing and other personal 
belongings in his room. In Haddow, it was significant that the boyfriend "did not move 
any furniture into appellant's home or keep there any personal items other than toiletry 
articles, a few items of clothing . . . and one picture album." 707 P.2d at 673. Further, in 
Jensen, "Wife . .. had only some of her clothing and toiletries wither her during her 
stay," 2007 UT App. 377, f 3. Where a common residence has been established, the 
Utah Court of Appeals found it important in Pendleton that "Joyce and Bill ate almost all 
meals together when Bill was in town-invariably at Joyce's house," and "Bill kept 
clothing and other personal effects at Joyce's home." 918 P.2d at 161. 
13 
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In this case, there was simply no evidence presented that Petitioner shared meals 
and food expenses with Mr. Hart, or kept clothing in his room. There was some evidence 
that Petitioner and Mr. Hart may have attended some parties or social gatherings together, 
but nothing that would make this situation comparable to the one described above in 
Pendleton. Tr. at 118: 16-21. As stated earlier, Petitioner did not have open access to 
Mr. Hart's living quarters. R. at 186: 9; Tr. at 12:24, 106:1-2 & 17-23, and 107:1-7. 
Also, the evidence presented at trial was devoid of any indication that Petitioner had 
personal effects or clothing stored in Mr. Hart's room. 
* * * 
At the heart of any determination that cohabitation exists, and subsequently 
common residence, is whether the parties "lived as though they were husband and wife." 
Sigg9 905 P.2d at 918. Based on the above factors indicated in subparagraphs one 
through three, the only reasonable conclusion is that Petitioner and Mr. Hart were not 
living as husband and wife or sharing a common residence. Here there was no common 
sharing of expenses, no free or common access to Mr. Hart's living quarters, sharing of 
food expenses or the storing of personal items. Simply sharing the same address should 
not be viewed as enough on its own. As a result, the "ultimate conclusion" of the trial 
court that there was a common residence was incorrect, and must be reversed. Jensen, 
2007UTApp.377,12. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER WAS 
ENGAGED IN A SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MR- HART ARE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, FURTHER, THE ULTIMATE CONCLUSION 
OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING SEXUAL CONTACT WAS ALSO 
INCORRECT AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Even if the trial court's ultimate conclusion that a common residence was shared 
between Petitioner and Mr. Hart was not in error, its findings of fact and ultimate 
conclusion that there was a sexual relationship between the two must be reversed. 
Cohabitation requires "(1) common residency and (2) sexual contact evidencing a 
conjugal association." Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160, n.L Sexual contact is defined as 
"participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing 
between husband and wife/' Haddow, 707 P,2d at 672. First, the findings of fact that 
there was any kind of sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mr. Hart were clearly 
erroneous. Second, and as a result of the erroneous findings, the ultimate conclusion of 
the trial court was incorrect and must be reversed. 
1. THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THERE WAS A SEXUAL 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PETITIONER AND MR. HART WERE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Petitioner challenges the findings of fact made by the trial court that there was a 
sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mr. Hart. The trial court found the following: 
14. Petitioner's parents tried to control Mike Hart and prevent 
any sexual relationship involving Mike Hart. However, they 
were unable to control him and prevent such contact 
between Mr. Hart and the Petitioner. 
16. There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike 
Hart, which the Court infers from the common residency of 
the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is corroborated by 
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the evidence that Petitioner elected to spend the night with 
Mike Hart in Salt Lake City. 
17. The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court 
indicates that Petitioner and Mike Hart had a sexual relationship. 
R. at 186: 14 & 16, 185: 16 and 17. 
The Rules of Appellate Procedure state "[a] party challenging a fact finding must 
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah R> App. P. 
24(a)(9). Further, Respondent must "marshal all evidence in favor of the facts as found 
by the trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact." 
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). After marshaling the 
evidence, it is clear that the trial court's findings of fact in regard to sexual contact 
between Petitioner and Mr. Hart were clearly erroneous. 
The Marshaled Evidence in Support of the Finding: 
Testimony of Douglas Hale Huntsman: 
Mr, Huntsman is a private investigator who was working in behalf of Respondent, 
Tr. at 7: 13-22. r \ 
Mr. Black: And, and when you say you conducted surveillance, what did you do? 
Mr. Huntsman: He, he indicated that she was living at her parents' house in 
Provo. And I went to that address and set up surveillance. He gave me the 
description of her, a green Isuzu Trooper. And a, I started on June 26th of 2007 
and I was there real early in the morning, approximately 6:30. And approximately 
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five minutes to 8:00 that morning I observed her getting into the a,.. The vehicle 
was parked on the back side of the house. There's, the house is located on a 
corner, There's a driveway on the back side, there's a basketball standard right 
near the driveway. And a, the vehicle was parked there backed in. And observed 
her getting in the vehicle driver side. Hispanic male with a bandana, a juvenile at 
the driver's door, looked like they were talking for about a minute. And then the 
male went around the front of the vehicle, got in the passenger side. And the 
vehicle started, smoked excessively, and headed eastbound towards Independence 
High School, and stopped at Independence High School in the student drop off 
area, Tr. at 8: 5-25. 
They were there, they were parked there for approximately five minutes. I 
couldn't see what was going on in the vehicle due to the congestion in the parking 
lot. But then the, the boy exited the car, went to school. And then she drove back 
to the residence. Tr. at 9: 1-5. 
Testimony of Petitioner: 
Mr. Black: So you, when you staying at your parents' house they were also 
there? 
Petitioner: Yes. 
Mr. Black: So Mike was at your parents' house while you were staying there? Tr. 
at 32: 22-25 and 33: L 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Testimony of Petitioner Continued: 
Mr. Black: Have you ever gone anywhere alone with Mike? 
Petitioner: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Where have you gone alone with Mike? 
Petitioner: We've... I take him, I take them to the store if they need it. He's the 
only one of the boys that did not work full-time. And they got allotments every 
month. I took him shopping to Jenex (phonetic) a couple times. I, I took him, 
wrell51 took all of the boys to school. We went to my daughter's house. Just 
average places. I never...I guess I don't know what you're meaning. I took him 
down to the gas station, I took him to get gas for the lawn mower before. 
Mr. Black: And did you ever take him to family reunions? 
Petitioner: Yes, I did. All of the boys, Tr. 33:9-23. 
Testimony of Respondent: 
Mr. Barker: Now you're . . . I just want to change gears just for a second. You're 
claiming that, that Becky has been cohabitating with a, with a 16 year old boy. 
What, what, what is your evidence of that? Could you j ust tell us? 
Respondent: My own personal evidence? 
Mr. Barker: Yes. 
Respondent: Other than me just seeing them together and witnessing them 
together and knowing that she was living there. Tr. at 90: 13-21. 
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Testimony of Bryce Robert Myers: 
Bryce Robert Myers is Petitioner and Respondent's son. Tr. at 98: 6-8 
Mr. Black: Show you what was marked as EXHIBIT #4, Is that the affidavit that 
you signed? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Is everything in that affidavit true and correct? 
Mr. Myers: Yes, 
Mr. Black: In paragraph 3 of that affidavit you said that you did not have any 
doubt that your mother Becky Sue Myers was having a sexual relationship with 
Mike, a foster boy, during the time that both of them lived with your grandmother 
from about May through August 2007. Is that, is that correct? 
Mr. Myers: No. 
Mr. Black: What do you mean no? That's not, I didn't read it correctly? 
Mr. Myers: I don't have proof of the sexual relationship. 
Mr. Black: You said you had no doubt. What was it in your mind that caused you 
to have no doubt? 
Mr. Myers: My understanding is they had a relationship. 
Mr. Black: Okay. How did you obtain that understanding? 
Mr. Myers: Well they, they spent time together, they hung out together. But I 
have no idea about the sexual part. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Did Mike speak about your mom as though he were his 
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girlfriend? 
Mr. Myers: A little bit. 
Mr. Black: So what did Mike say to you that gave you the impression that they 
were boyfriend and girlfriend? 
Mr. Mvers: He never actually told me they were boyfriend and girlfriend. He 
would just come to me when they weren't getting along, for support: wrhen he was 
angry. 
Mr. Black: Can you give me an example of a situation like that? And kind of 
explain for the court what the interaction was between you and him? 
Mr. Mvers: What do you mean, interaction? 
Mr. Black: Well, can you think of a specific instance where he came to you and 
was angry? 
Mr. Myers: Not off the top of my head, no. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Did you ever see a, Mike and a, your mom flirting with each 
other? 
Mr. Mvers: I wouldn't say flirting. -
Mr. Black: Look at paragraph 4 of your affidavit, second sentence of that, of that 
paragraph. Didn't you say, I saw them flirting with each other all the time. 
Mr. Mvers: That's what I wrote. 
Mr. Black: Is that true? 
Mr. Myers: Yes and no, 
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Mr. Black: What do you mean yes and no? 
Mr. Myers: Well, Mike was a good guy. He was, he was a, I don't know, like just 
the wray he approaches things was really nice about things. And they would just... 
I don't know how to word i t Tr. at 98: 17-25; 99: 146; 100: 17-25; and 101: 1-
20. 
Testimony of Bryce Robert Myers Continued: 
Mr. Black: So did you see your mom and Mike flirting with each other? 
Mr. Myers: Yes, sir, 
Mr. Black: And a, did you also see that they slept in the same room together? 
Mr. Myers: One time, sir. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Did they ever try to hide the fact that they were sleeping in the 
same room together? 
Mr. Myers: It wasn't, that wasn't a matter, sir. 
Mr. Black: I'm sorry? 
Mr. Myers: That wasn't a matter. 
Mr. Black: What do you mean? I'm not, I don't understand your answer. What 
do you mean by that wasn't a matter? 
Mr. Myers: Well, no. 
Mr. Black: No what? 
Mr. Myers: No to your question. 
Mr. Black: No, there weren't trying to hide that fact? 
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Mr. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: they were sleeping in the same room together but not hiding it? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Did you ever encounter your mom and Mike downstairs on the couch 
sleeping together? 
Mr. Myers: Not together, no. Mike would come down to sleep on the floor and 
she slept on the couch. 
Mr. Black: So she would be on the couch and he would sleep on the floor? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Even though he had his own bedroom? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: And you found them in that position? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. They weren't actually sleeping. It was more in the late 
afternoon. Tr. at 103: 22-25; 104: 147; and 107: 849. 
Testimony of Bryce Robert Myers Continued: 
Mr. Black: During May of 2007 did Mike go to you crying because he had had a 
fight with your mom? 
Mr. Myers: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Black: And a, what was your understanding regarding the reason that, that he 
was crying about that fight? 
Mr. Myers: They weren't getting along, they had a dispute, and his temper was 
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flaring and he took off. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Did he act like a heartsick love, a heartbroken lovesick boy? 
Mr. Myers: Not really. 
Mr. Black: What do you mean not really? Did he or didn't he? What was it— 
Mr. Myers: No. 
Mr. Black: In your Affidavit you said, He acted like a heartbroken lovesick boy. 
Paragraph 5 of your affidavit. Is that a true statement? 
Mr. Myers: I didn't' write that 
Mr. Black: Did you sign this affidavit? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Did you read it before you've signed it? 
Mr. Myers: Probably not 
Mr. Black: So, so was, so what was he acting like? 
Mr. Myers: He was acting upset. 
Mr. Black: Did you have, was there an incident on the 4th of July of 2007? 
Mr. Myers: Yes, Sir. ''% 
Mr. Black: And a, did your mom call you while you and Mike were at a friend's 
house? 
Mr. Myers: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Black: And is it true that your mom flew into a jealous rage over the phone? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. 
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Mr. Black: Okay. And is that because she thought Mike was hanging out with 
some other girls? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Did, did she tell you that she was done with him because he 
was cheating on her? 
Mr. Myers: I don't know that, no. 
Mr. Black: Look at paragraph 6 of your affidavit, the last sentence. Do you say in 
that affidavit, She told me she was done with him because he was cheating on her? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Did the same jealous behavior happen on more than one 
occasion? 
Mr. Myers: Maybe once, one other time. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Was she jealous if, if Mike was out with somebody else and 
not with her? 
Mr. Myers: No, 
Mr. Black: Isn't that what you said in paragraph 7 of your affidavit? Didn't you 
say, She had to be with Mike all the time or she became jealous? 
Mr. Myers: I may have wrote that. But, no. 
Mr. Black: Did some time in August Mike go to you and tell you again that he 
had gotten into another fight with your mom? 
Mr. Myers: Say that again. 
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Mr. Black: In August of 2007 did Mike go to you again and tell you that he had 
gotten into a fight with your mom? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: And a, did he tell you that he had punched out a window of her car? 
Mr. Myers: No. I was told by somebody else. 
Mr. Black: So he didn't tell you that? 
Mr, Myers: No. 
Mr. Black: Who told you that? 
Mr. Myers: I don't even remember. 
107: 21-25; 108: 1-2 & 13-25; 109: 1-25; and 110: 1-25. 
Testimony of Bryce Robert Myers Continued: 
Mr. Black: Did you say in your affidavit that he as moved up to Salt Lake? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Did your mom go to you shortly after Mike moved and ask if 
she could take your car to Salt Lake to see Mike? 
Mr, Myers: Yes. % 
Mr. Black: And did you call your mom the next morning because she hadn't yet 
returned the car? 
Mr, Myers: Yes. 
Mr, Black: And did you tell her you needed to have your car back to go to work? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. 
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Mr. Black: Did she tell you she had just left Mike's house and was on her way 
back? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. Tr. I l l : 19-25 and 112: 1-9. 
Testimony of Misty Lynn Myers: 
Misty Lynn Myers is Petitioner and Respondent's daughter. Tr. at 114: 17-19. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Did you prepare an affidavit in this case? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Is that EXHIBIT #5 that you have in front of you? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: And did you sign that affidavit? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: And a, is everything in that affidavit true and correct? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Paragraph 3 you stated, My mother Becky Sue Myers had an ongoing 
romantic relationship with a foster care boy Mike while both of them lived at the 
my grandfather's home from about April 2007 through August 2007. Is that 
correct? 
Ms. Myers: To my knowledge, yes. 
Mr. Black: How did, what a, what did you witness that caused you to believe that 
Becky and Mike were having an ongoing romantic relationship? 
Ms, Myers: They were together all the time. Uhm, me and my mom have had 
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kind of a rocky relationship. And if I ever said anything at all like negative about 
her towards her a, if we ever got in arguments about anything he would a, kind of 
go off on me about it, kind of stand— 
Mr. Black: Who would? Mike? 
Ms. Myers: Mike, Mike would. And he would stand up for my mom. And a, and 
they were always together. That's— 
Mr. Black: Are you a, are you acquainted, you're acquainted with a foster child of 
your grandparents, that was living with your grandparents named Mike. Is that 
correct? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: And do you knowr when he started living in the house with your 
grandparents? 
Ms. Myers: I, I believe it was around April if I remember correctly. 
Mr. Black: What year? 
Ms. Myers: 2007. 
Mr. Black: Okay, And do you know how long he resided there? 
Ms. Myers: he was there up until I believe September, late August, early 
September. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Have... During that time period did your mom live in the 
house with your grandparents? 
Ms. Myers: To my knowledge, yes. 
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Mr. Black: Okay. How is it that you obtained that knowledge? 
Ms. Myers: Uhm--
Mr. Black: Did you witness them, her staying the night there? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. And she, any time she needed to go home for something like 
that's where she'd go. Like if she said she needed to go home to shower or 
something like that that's where she would go. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Did, do you know if she got any mail there? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Okay. In paragraph 6 of your affidavit you say, From April through 
the present Mike and my mother have been in separable. They have always been 
or always together whenever I see them. 
Ms. Myers: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Mr. Black: Is that a true statement? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Where would you see them? 
Ms. Myers: She would come to my apartment anct Mike would be with her. There 
was a, family get togethers like birthdays and stuff like that when she would bring 
him. And she, I would be at my sister's and a, she would come over and he'd be 
with her there as well. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Did they, was there anything about their behavior that you 
observed that caused you to believe they were in a romantic relationship? 
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Ms. Myers: The only thing I noticed is like he'd get mad a lot like really easy 
with her a, like I guess like they would get in fights, but like I mean, as far as 
noticing anything in their relationship, I mean, people get in arguments and stuff 
in relationships. Friends don't argue and, and fight like that, you know,— 
Mr. Black: So it wasn't like— 
Ms. Myers: -thatoften. 
Mr. Black: - it wasn't like friends fighting, it was like lovers fighting? Is that, is 
that would you observed? 
Ms. Myers: Yes, 
Mr. Black: Was there an incident in May of 2007 when your mom went to pick 
up, to pick you up from Smith's in Orem? 
Ms. Myers: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Mr. Black: And a, when she got there did she tell you that she had to pick up your 
grandmother's foster children as well? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: And did she go to pick up those children? 
Ms. Myers: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Mr. Black: Where did she go to do that? 
Ms. Myers: She picked them up, I believe it was a, oh, it was on University 
Parkway in Orem. I think it was a music store they have over there. I don't 
remember what it was, I don't remember, it's FYE now or something. 
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Mr. Black: Okay. So your mom was driving the vehicle. Right? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: And where were you in the vehicle? 
Ms. Myers: I was in the front seat when she picked me up. 
Mr. Black: Okay. And when you went to get the boys did the seating 
arrangement change at all? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. She told me that I had to sit in the back so Mike could sit up 
front. 
Mr. Black: She didn't ask any of the other boys to sit up front, just Mike? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: And, and what was your impression about that behavior? What, what 
was your immediate reaction to that a,~ 
Ms. Myers: I asked why. Like, like basically told her he could sit in the back. 
And she said no, that he was sitting up front. And so I had to get in the back seat. 
Mr. Black: Okay. At a, at the end of May 2007 was there a birthday party for 
your niece and nephew at a park in Provo? •• % 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: And was it a family party? 
Ms. Myers: There was friends there as well, yes. 
Mr. Black: Okay. 
Ms. Myers: Friends and family. 
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Mr. Black: Did your mom go to that party? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: How did, how did she arrive at that party? Did she arrive by herself? 
Ms. Myers: She was with Mike? 
Mr. Black: Just, just with Mike? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Was she with anyone else or just with Mike? 
Ms. Myers: No. It was just her and Mike. 
Mr. Black: And did, did you see how they arrived? Did they, did they come in 
her car? Did they walk there? How did— 
Ms. Myers: They were in her car. 
Mr. Black: So it was just her and Mike in her car? 
Ms. Myers: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Mr. Black: Arriving together at the party? 
Ms. Myers: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Mr. Black: Did they leave the party together? **\ 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Did you think that was strange? 
Ms. Myers: Yes, 
Mr. Black: Okay. Why did you think it was strange? 
Ms. Myers: Just seeing them come together alone to birthday parties, more than 
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once they did. I, I don't see why Mike would come to a birthday party and not the 
rest of the foster boys or, you know, every time that there was a birthday party 
Mike and my mom would come together by no one else would be with them. Like 
why wouldn't the other boys be with them if she was bringing one of them. Tr. at 
114:22-25; 115: 1-24; 116: 17-25; 117: 1-18; 118: 8-25; 119: 1-25; 120: 1-25; 
121: 1-15 & 121: 21-25; and 122: 1-7. 
Testimony of Misty Lynn Myers Continued: 
Mr. Black: Okay. In August of 2007 did you help your sister move? 
Ms. Myers: I, I remember, I'm trying to remember. I did help her move some 
things into a storage unit 
Mr. Black: Okay. And did you see some of the things in the storage unit? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Did you notice in the storage unit some letters sitting on top of a 
stroller? 
Ms. Myers: They were pictures. 
Mr. Black: Oh, pictures sitting on top of a stroller. What were they pictures of? 
Ms. Myers: I don't remember correctly. Just drawings. 
Mr. Black: Were there some items addressed to Becky from Mike? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. It said like to Becky from Mike on them. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Did you ask your mom about those items? 
Ms. Myers: Uhm~« 
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Mr. Black: Did you— 
Ms. Myers: No. 
Mr. Black: - - talk to her about those items? 
Ms. Myers: No. 
Mr. Black: In paragraph 10 of your affidavit, and maybe I'm asking the question 
wrong, you say, When I later asked my mom about the letters she appeared to be 
embarrassed and defensive. Did you later ask her about those items? 
Ms. Myers: No. I, I remember she a, my sister had talked to her and she was 
upset that I had seen them and a, she had said some things to my sister. And I, I 
didn't talk to her about the letters. 
Mr. Black: Okay. But, but your mom was upset that you had seen the items from 
Mike? 
Ms. Myers: Yes, she... Yes. Yes. 
Mr. Black: Did you ask her if she knew what would happen if they got caught 
together? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. - I 
Mr. Black: And what did she tell you? 
Ms. Myers: She just said she knew, 
Mr. Black: And what did you interpret that to mean? 
Ms. Myers: I just told her a, that if any, like if they got caught together that, I 
mean, she would be in a lot of trouble for it. The only thing that she, she said was 
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just I know what will happen so... 
Mr. Black: That she knew what would happen? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. Tr. at 122: 8-25; 123: 1-25; and 124: 1-4. 
Testimony of Misty Lynn Myers Continued: 
Mr. Black: Okay. Axe there times that you went to visit your grandmother and 
when you went to visit you were told that your mom was not home? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: And were you also told on those occasions that she had gone out with 
Mike? 
Ms. Myers: A few times, yes. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Just the two of them together? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Would she sometimes visit you at your apartment or at your sister's 
house? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: And did she ever show up with, with anyone other than Mike? 
Ms. Myers: There, there was a few times that she did have all the boys a, that she 
was picking them up from, from school or the mall or something like that. The 
majority of the time it was just her and Mike. 
Mr. Black: Just the two of them together? 
Ms. Myers: Yes. Tr. at 124: 5-24, 
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Testimony of Taska Ruis: 
Taska Ruis is Petitioner's Mother. Tr. at 126: 14-15. 
Mr. Black: Did a, was there a foster boy named Mike that lived with you? 
Ms. Ruis: There sure was. 
Mr. Black: So she did go out with Mike by herself? 
Ms. Ruis: She went to the store and right back. Tr. at 127: 2-4 & 127: 20-23. 
Testimony of Burton Ruis: 
Burton Ruis is Petitioner's father. Tr. at 134: 7-8. 
Mr. Black: Was Mike also, Mike Hart also living with you at the time? 
Mr. Ruis: Mike is a foster boy. There was five boys in my home. Not just Mike. 
Five, 
Mr. Black: Was Mike also living with you at the time? 
Mr. Ruis: Yes, as a foster boy— 
Mr. Black: Okay. 
Mr. Ruis: - under the state. Tr. at 134: 22-25 and 135: 1-4. 
Testimony of Burton Ruis Continued: 
Mr. Black: And why was he removed from the home? Did he break a window? 
Mr. Ruis: He not only broke the window, he broke the phone, he hit my doors, 
and almost actually looked like he was going to hit me. 
Mr. Black: Okay. 
Mr. Ruis: So we had him recalled up. 
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Mr. Black: Did he break a window in a car? 
Mr. Ruis: Yes, he did. 
Mr. Black: Whose car did he break a window? 
Mr. Ruis: My daughter's car. 
Mr. Black: He broke your daughter's window? 
Mr, Ruis: He kicked it out 
Mr. Black: I see. Was he angry at your daughter, do you know? . , 
Mr. Ruis: Evidently. I mean, he kicked his window out 
Mr. Black: Okay. Did your daughter and a, Mike ever get in fights? 
Mr. Ruis: Well, if I had known about it I would have sure stopped it That night 
was, yes, she was in the car crying and, and a, and he chased car down, threw the 
phone. Tr. at 139: 3-25 and 140: 1 
* * * 
Finally, the affidavits of Bryce Robert Myers and Misty Lynn Myers are attached in 
Addendum as Exhibits "C" and "D" respectively, for marshalling purposes. 
Evidence that does not Support the Finding: 
Testimony of Douglas Hale Huntsman: 
Mr. Barker: So, you, you just observed a, them for five days. Is that right? 
Mr. Huntsman: Yes. 
Mr. Barker: And did you even, did you ever see them do anything? Hold hands 
or anything, kiss each other or anything like that? 
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Mr. Huntsman: No. 
Mr. Barker: Okay. And so my question, let me see if I can rephrase this better. 
You a, you only observed them for five days. So you can't testify whether there 
was any long-term cohabitation between Ms. Myers and this juvenile. Isn't that 
correct? 
Mr. Huntsman: That's correct. I saw them once. Tr. at 10: 12-24. 
Testimony of Petitioner: 
Mr. Black: Did you ever kiss Mike? 
Petitioner: No. 
Mr. Black: Did you ever hold his hand? 
Petitioner: No. 
Mr. Black: Did you have sexual relations with Mike? 
Petitioner: No, I did not. 
Mr. Black: Did you sleep in the same bed with Mike? 
Petitioner: Never. Tr. at 37: 12-19. 
Testimony of Respondent: r 
Mr. Barker: And her parents a, they, they take in foster children. Correct? 
Respondent: Yes. 
Mr. Barker: And so you've seen Becky with Mike a, but you've never, have you 
ever seen them hold hands? 
Respondent: No, no. 
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Mr. Barker: Okay. So your yourself don't have any personal knowledge of any 
cohabitation alone? 
Respondent: No, I have not see them together, seen them sleep together or be 
intimate together or anything like that. No, sir. Tr. at 91: 1-1L 
Testimony of Bryce Robert Myers: 
Mr. Black: In paragraph 3 of that affidavit you said that you did not have any 
doubt that your mother Becky Sue Myers was having a sexual relationship with 
Mike, a foster boy, during the time that both of them lived with your grandmother 
from about May through August 2007. Is that, is that correct? 
Mr. Myers: No. 
Mr. Black: What do you mean no? That's not, I didn't read it correctly? 
Mr, Myers: I don't have proof of the sexual relationship. 
Mr. Black: You said you had no doubt. What was it in your mind that caused you 
to have no doubt? 
Mr. Myers: My understanding is they had a relationship. Tr. at 98: 23-25 and 99: 
1-10. 
Testimony of Bryce Robert Myers Continued: 
Mr. Black: Okay. So, and your mom slept downstairs on the couch? 
Mr. Myers: Downstairs on the couch. 
Mr. Black: Did you ever... And so Mike had his own bedroom? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. 
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Mr. Black: With a roommate? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. 
Mr. Black: Did you ever encounter your mom and Mike downstairs on the couch 
sleeping together? 
Mr. Myers: Not together, no. Mike would come down to sleep on the floor and 
she slept on the couch. 
Mr. Black: So she would be on the couch and he would sleep on the floor? 
Mr. Myers: Yes. Tr. at 107: 1-14. 
Testimony of Bryce Myers Continued: 
Mr. Barker: Bryce, Til be real short here. I just want to ask you one thing. Did 
you ever witness Mike and your mother a, cohabitating together on a regular 
basis? Were they living together somewhat like man and wife? 
Mr. Myers: No. Tr. at 113: 10-15. 
Testimony of Misty Lynn Myers: 
Mr. Black: Did you ever witness Mike and your mother spend the night at your 
grandparents'house? ;-
Ms. Myers: No, I never witnessed that. Tr. at 117: 19-21. 
Testimony of Misty Lynn Myers Continued: 
Mr. Black: And during that party how did they treat each other? 
Ms. Myers: They really didn't even sit next to each other at the party. Mike was, 
he was like playing with my niece and nephew at the party. Tr. at 121: 16-20. 
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Testimony of Taska Ruis: 
Mr. Black: Okay. And a, did Mike and Becky have a romantic relationship? 
Ms. Ruis: No, sir. 
Mr. Black: Not at all? 
Ms. Ruis: Not at all, sir. 
Mr. Black: Did they ever go out together? 
Ms. Ruis: They went out, but they had other people with them. 
Mr. Black: They never went out alone? 
Ms. Ruis: Once in a while they went to the store. She did it with my other foster 
boys. Do you want me to bring all of them in and tell you? 
Ms. Ruis: Mike was on a time limit They were proctor boys. I knew where they 
was, I knew where they went. They had a trackers, they had therapists, they had 
group therapy. 
Mr. Black: Okay. How many bedrooms do you have in your home? 
Ms. Ruis: I have three bedrooms. 
Mr. Black: Okay. Do you and your husband sleep in one of the bedrooms? 
Ms. Ruis: Yes, we do. 
Mr. Black: Does anyone else sleep in that bedroom with you? 
Ms. Ruis: No, they don't 
Mr. Black: Who sleeps in the other two bedrooms? 
Ms. Ruis: The other boys slept in the bedrooms. 
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xMr. Black; Okay. 
Ms. Ruis; And the bedrooms are right across from my bedroom by the way, they 
are upstairs. Tr. at 127; 5-16 & 25; 128: 1-3 & 20-25; and 129: 1-6. 
Testimony of Burton Ruis: 
Mr. Black: Okay. Do you know of any reason why he would be angry at your 
daughter? 
Mr. Ruis: No, not really. Tr. at 139: 19-21. 
Testimony of Steven Peterson: 
Steven Peterson was a foster child staying at the residence. Tr. at 159: 1-4. 
Mr. Barker: Okay. And you say you were a, roommates with Mike? 
Mr. Peterson: Yes. 
Mr. Barker: Did Mike ever talk to you about Becky? 
Mr. Peterson: No. We never had discussion concerning Becky. 
Mr. Barker: Did you ever see Mike and Becky together in bed anywhere or~ 
Mr. Peterson: No. 
Mr. Barker: How about when you returned home in, back to the Ruises in the end 
of July a, did Mike, did you ever had have a conversation with Mike at that time? 
Mr. Peterson: Yes. I talked to Mike several times on the phone. 
Mr. Barker: Did he ever talk to you about Becky at that time? 
Mr. Peterson: No. 
Mr. Barker: And you were back, again, you were back at the Ruis' house at this 
41 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
time, the end of July 2007. Right? 
Mr. Peterson: Yes. < 
Mr. Barker: Did you, how often did you see Becky at that time? 
Mr. Peterson: Maybe, maybe once or twice a week when we went to lunch with 
Taska and Frank. 
Mr. Barker: Okay. And did you ever see a, Becky and Mike together at that time? 
Mr. Peterson: No. 
Mr. Barker: Okay. Now a, did Mike have a, from what you witnessed did Mike 
have a, a bad temper? 
Mr. Peterson: Yes. 
Mr. Barker: And how would he display that? Did you ever witness him 
displaying that towards anyone? 
Mr. Peterson: Several times. 
Mr. Barker: Okay, Was it, was it to a, who, who was it towards that you saw? 
Mr. Peterson: Towards everyone. He would, whoever was around us who he 
would get upset at, if it was me, if it was Taska, if it was another boy that's who 
he'd be angry at regardless of who it was. Tr. at 160: 2-25 and 161: 1-12. 
Testimony of Shawn Louis Russell: 
Shawn Louis Russell was a foster child staying at the residence. Tr. at 165: 22-23. 
Mr. Barker: Okay. And would you ever see a, Becky with Mike together on a 
couch? 
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Mr. Russell: No. 
Mr. Barker: Okay, And where did you sleep when you went there? 
Mr, Russell: In the frontroom on the couch, 
Mr. Barker: Okay. And so you were, you were on the couch and, and a, but you 
never saw Becky and Mike together? 
Mr. Russell: No. 
* * * 
Mr. Black: Okay. And you never saw Becky and Mike together alone? 
Mr. Russell: No. 
Mr. Black: Were they ever alone together? 
Mr. Russell: Not that I saw. 
Mr. Black: Not that you saw? Did they ever go anywhere in the car together? 
Mr. Russell: Not that I saw, no. Tr. 167: 5-13 and 169: 14-21. 
He * * 
What is relevant here is that there is no direct evidence of a sexual relationship. 
Even if the evidence that supports the finding is taken to be completely true, at best it 
shows that Petitioner and Mr. Hart may have spent some time together, slept in the same 
room while Petitioner was on the couch and Mr. Hart was on the floor, stayed at the same 
physical address for approximately four months, that Mr. Hart had a bad temper and may 
have given some letters or drawings to Petitioner, Petitioner went to see Mr. Hart in Salt 
Lake City once, and that the two appeared to act jealous from time to time. The 
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affidavits of Petitioner and Respondent's children state affirmatively that there was a 
sexual relationship, however, those conclusions must be based on evidence, and as seen 
above, the evidence supporting such conclusions was inadequate. It is important to note 
as well that Mr. Myers was obviously less than certain regarding his statements in his 
affidavit and clarified certain statements at trial. For an example, see Tr. at 98: 23-25 and 
99: 1-10. Further, the trial court itself stated in its findings the following: 
There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike 
Hart, which the Court infers from the common residency of 
the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is corroborated by 
the evidence that Petitioner elected to spend the night with 
Mike Hart in Salt Lake City. 
R. at 186: 16 and 185: 16. (emphasis added). Even the trial court indicates that there is 
no direct evidence, but rather, that it inferred a sexual relationship. Id. None of the 
witnesses testified that they had so^n Mr. Hart and Petitioner kissing, hugging or even 
holding hands. Respondent had the burden of proving a sexual relationship, akin to that 
between husband and wife, not that Petitioner and Mr. Hart spent time together. See 
Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672 (requiring "participation in a relatively permanent sexual 
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife.") Therefore, the 
evidence fails to support the findings of the trial court. 
An examination of the case law regarding cohabitation also shows that the above 
evidence is inadequate to support the findings of fact made by the trial court. In Siggy it 
was admitted that sexual intercourse had occurred, specifically, it was admitted that 
"Haynes had open access to her condominium, visited frequently and that they had 
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intercourse." 905 P.2d at 911, n.4. Similarly, in another matter examined by the Utah 
Supreme Court, the party who had lost the right to receive alimony, during direct 
examination "admitted that early in her relationship with Dennis Warr, they did have 
sexual relations and that she gave him a venereal disease." Wacker v. Wacker, 668 P.2d 
533, 534 (Utah 1983). Consider also Garcia v. Garcia, where a party admitted that '"she 
and Ellis shared a bedroom, bed, and had sexual contact at that residence/' 2002 UT 
App. 381, If 2, 60 P.3d 1174. In Pendleton, sexual contact was admitted as well, "[i]n 
this case, sexual contact has been admitted." 918 P.2d at 160, n.L Finally, the 
cohabitating couple in the Haddow matter had "taken a vacation together to Hawraii, 
'sleeping in the same bed and having sexual relations.5" 707 P.2d at 672. 
The above cases show that evidence much more conclusive than what was 
presented as evidence in this matter, was produced to show sexual contact. Specifically, 
the above cases either contained admissions, or obvious proof that the parties had sexual 
contact with each other, like taking an extended vacation while sleeping in the same bed 
together, or infecting another with a venereal disease. In this case, the above cited 
evidence simply does not rise to adequate proof to support the trial court's findings. In 
order for the element of sexual contact to be satisfied, it must be shown that there was 
"participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing 
between husband and wife." Id. Even if the evidence produced above could some how 
be interpreted to show that there was sexual contact, it certainly does not show that it was 
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permanent, or akin to that existing between husband and wife.2 As such, the findings of 
fact of the trial court should be viewed as clearly erroneous. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT'S ULTIMATE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS 
A SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PETITIONER AND MR. HART 
WAS INCORRECT AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Sexual contact is defined as "participation in a relatively permanent sexual 
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife." Id. As was 
stated above, the findings of fact in regard to any sexual contact between Petitioner and 
Mr. Hart were clearly erroneous. Further, the findings of the trial court do not even 
indicate that the "sexual relationship" was permanent, or that it was akin to one existing 
between husband and wife. R, at 186: 14 & 16, 185: 16 and 17. Petitioner will not 
reiterate what was already stated in the immediately preceding section. However, 
because of the erroneous findings, the trial court's ultimate conclusion regarding sexual 
contact between Petitioner and Mr. Hart was incorrect and should be reversed. 
2
 It should be noted that Petitioner in no way admits to having had any sexual contact with 
Mr. Hart. The above statement should not be interpreted as an admission that there was 
even infrequent sexual contact between herself and Mr. Hart. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully submits that the trial court's 
decision to terminate alimony be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / f y day of July, 2009. 
SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
EL M. BARKER 
TREYA.CALLISTER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
47 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this / f y a a y of July, 2009,1 hand delivered a copy of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Guy L. Black, attorney for Respondent/Appellee, at 
the following address: 
Guy L. Black 
Greenwood & Black 
1840 No. State Street #200 
Provo,UT 84604 
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GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 801 377-4652 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BECKY SUE MYERS, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Petitioner, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
Case No. 064400347 
TRACY LYNN MYERS, 
Judge Samuel McVey 
Respondent. 
This matter came before the Court for trial, the Honorable Samuel McVey 
presiding, on July 1,2008. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Samuel M. 
Barker, Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L. Black. The Court heard 
testimony, and arguments from counsel. The Court, having considered the evidence before it 
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties in this matter were divorced on June 6,2006, 
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce in this case, Respondent was ordered to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pay Petitioner $1,200.00 per month alimony. 
In the late spring and summer of 2007, Petitioner began staying on and off 
at her parent's home in Provo. She testified that she spent nights there on 
the weekends. 
There is some dispute as to the number of nights Petitioner spent at her 
parent's home. Some witnesses testified that Petitioner was an injfrequent 
guest at her parent's home. However, a private investigator, Mr. 
Hunstman, testified that during the peribd from June 26, 2007 through 
June 30, 2007, he saw the Petitioner's car at her parent's home on four of 
five days, or 80% of the days he had her under surveillance. The Court 
finds the most credible and persuasive evidence to be that Petitioner spent 
at least 80% of her nights at her parent's home. 
On the 26th of June, 2007, Mr. Hunstman saw Petitioner leave her parent's 
home in the early morning in the company of a young man fitting the 
description of Mike Hart. He saw her drive the young man to 
Independence High School. From this evidence, the Court finds that 
Petitioner and Mike Hart had contact with each other on friendly terms. 
The Court also finds that Petitioner and Mike Hart probably spent at least 
that night in the same house. 
It is undisputed that Mike Hart resided at the home of Petitioner's parents 
during the late spring and summer of 2007. 
• - - 1 8 ? 
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7. It is undisputed that Petitioner received mail during the spring and summer 
of 2007 at her parent's home. 
8. It is undisputed that Petitioner listed her parent's home as her address on 
documents she submitted to the court in, a separate criminal case. 
9. Petitioner slept on the downstairs coakn at her parent's home, often 
arriving there late at night 
10. Petitioner's parents did not charge her rent. 
11. Petitioner did not produce any credible evidence (e.g., rent receipts, bills, 
etc.) to show that she was living at any other address during the spring and 
summer of 2007. 
12. The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court is that 
Petitioner's residence during the spring and summer of 2007 was her 
parent's house. 
13. Petitioner was seen in a familial relationship, paired up with Mike Hart 
and going together with him to events as a couple. 
14. Petitioner's parents tried to control Mike Hart and prevent any sexual 
relationship involving Mike Hart. However, they were unable to control 
him and prevent such contact between Mr. Hart and the Petitioner. 
15. On at least one occasion, Petitioner's son discovered his mother alone with 
Mike Hart by the couch downstairs in the home of Petitioner's parents. 
16. There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which 
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the Court infers from the common residency of the Petitioner and Mike 
Hart, and which is corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner elected to 
spend the night with Mike Hart in Salt Lake City. 
17. The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court 
indicates that Petitioner and Mike Hart had a sexual relationship. 
18. Respondent has been depositing his alimony payments with the Court for 
the last few months. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner established a residence at her parent's home during the late 
spring and summer of 2007. 
2. Mike Hart resided at the home of Petitioner's parents during the late 
spring and summer of 2007. 
3. Petitioner and Mike Hart had a common residency. 
4. There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which 
the court infers from the common residency of the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is 
corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner elected to spend the night with Mike Hart in 
Salt Lake City. 
5. As Respondent has established a common residency between the 
Petitioner and Mike Hart, the burden of proving a lack of sexual contact shifts to the 
Petitioner. While Petitioner denies such contact, her actions indicate otherwise. The 
Court concludes that Petitioner has not met her burden to establish lack of sexual contact. 
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6. Pursuant to Section 30-3-5(10), an order for alimony in this case 
terminates upon establishment by the Respondent that Petitioner is cohabitating with 
another person. 
7. In this case a condition of cohabitation exists, and alimony should be 
terminated effective January 31, 2008. 
8. From the funds on deposit with the Court, one-month's alimony, or 
$1,200.00 should be paid to Petitioner, which will satisfy Respondent's alimony 
obligation to Petitioner through January 31, 2008. The remaining balance on deposit 
with the Court should be paid to Respondent. 
DATED this A day of u C T 6 k& , 2008, 
BY THE COURT: ,.,„... 
/ A 
(_•- -~><^f 
SA^ MUEL MCVEY / 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
1U. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify I mailed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following, this 
L day of -Q CT
 > 2008: 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, Utah 84017 
A. 
> x 
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• GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 801 377-4652 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BECKY SUE MYERS, 
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE 
Petitioner, OF DIVORCE 
vs. 
Case No. 064400347 
TRACY LYNN MYERS, 
Judge Samuel McVey 
Respondent. 
This matter came before the Court for trial, the Honorable Samuel McVey 
presiding, on July 1, 2008. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Samuel M. 
Barker. Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L. Black. The Court heard 
testimony, and arguments from counsel. The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, hereby ORDERS AS FOLLOWS 
1. Respondent's obligation to pay Petitioner alimony is terminated in this 
case, effective January 31, 2008. 
2. The clerk of the court shall pay $1,200 of the funds on deposit with the 
^ X 1 9 2 
4TH DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAfr-
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Court in this matter to Petitioner, by making such payment payable to 
Becky Sue Myers and Samuel M. Barker, and mailing such payment to 
Petitioner's attorney, Samuel M. Barker. 
3. The remaining balance on deposit with the Court in this matter shall be 
paid by the clerk of the court to Respondent, by making such payment 
payable to Tracy Lynn Myers and Guy L. Black, and mailing such 
payment to Respondent's attorney, Guy L. Black. 
4. The Decree of Divorce in this case is hereby modified, consistent with the 
foregoing. •" " 
DATED this h day of 0 C^ro {ULJT~~ 2008. 
BY THE COURT: - . • ^ t :'t^ 
SA&UELMCVEY / 
DISTRICT C O W JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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NOTICE 
Please take notice that the undersigned will submit the above and foregoing document to the 
Court for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of the mailing certificate 
for this document, plus three (3) days for mailing unless written objection is filed prior to the 
time. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify I mailed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER MODIFYING DECREE to the following, this / V day of 
J ^ / , 2008: 
/ 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, Utah 84017 
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GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 377-4652 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BECKY SUE MYERS, 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYCE MYERS 
Petitioner, . 
vs. 
Civil No. 064400347 
TRACY LYNN MYERS, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF ) 
ss: 
COUNTYOF • ) 
BRYCE MYERS, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the adult son of Petitioner and Respondent in this matter. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and if called upon to 
testify, I would testify in accordance with this affidavit. 
3. I do not have any doubt that my mother, Becky Sue Myers, was having a 
sexual relationship with Mike, a foster boy, during the time both of them 
lived with my grandmother, from about May through August, 2007. 
K, ;: O r. 
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Mike often spoke about Mom to me when he and I hung out together. He 
spoke of her as his girlfriend. I saw them flirting with each other all the 
time. They also slept in the same room together, although they tried to hide 
the fact that they were sleeping together. Mom would go downstairs and 
sleep on the couch instead of sleeping in her room. Mike would go 
downstairs too. I caught him "sleeping" on the floor next to the couch, 
while my mother was "sleeping" on the couch. 
Sometime during May, 2007, Mike came to me crying because he had a 
fight with Mom, because they were having a rocky time in their relationship. 
He told me that he understood why Dad left Mom. He acted like a heart-
broken, love-sick boy. 
Sometime near the Fourth of July, 2007, my mom called me while Mike and 
I were at my friend's house. She flew into a jealous rage over the phone, 
because she thought Mike was hanging out with girls. She told me she was 
done with him because he was cheating on her. 
On several other occasions, the same jealous behavior happened. She had to 
be with Mike all the time, or she became jealous. My mom was always 
calling me when I was hanging out with Mike. She was always freaked out 
claiming that he was with some other girl, instead of with her. 
Sometime around August, Mike came to me and told me that he had gotten 
into a fight again with my mom. He told me he had punched out the window 
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of her car because he was upset that he had found a crack cocaine pipe in her 
purse. It is common knowledge that my mom has had a drug problem. 
>. After Mike was removed from my grandparent's home, after their foster-
care license was revoked, Mike was moved up to Salt Lake. My mom came 
to me sometime shortly after the move and asked if she could take my car to 
Salt Lake to see Mike because her car wouldn't make the trip. I called my 
Mom the next morning because I needed my car to get to work. She told me 
she had just left Mike's house and was on her way back. 
DATED this Q\ day of ffcRtt fifty , 2008. 
nryteJ^^S 
Btb^E MYERS 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this^l^day of ]_JbrUQt 
2008 by BRYCE MYERS. 
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GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 377-4652 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BECKY SUE MYERS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TRACY LYNN MYERS, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF 
) 
ss: 
) 
AFFIDAVIT OF RUSTY MYERS 
Civil No/064400347 
MISTY MYERS, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the adult daughter of Petitioner and Respondent in this matter, ' 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts sti forth herein, and if called upon to 
testify, I would testify in accordance with this affidavit. 
DEFENDANTS 
CASE NO.„ 
DATE; 
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My mother, Becky Sue Myers, had an ongoing, romantic relationship with a 
foster-care boy, Mike, while both of them lived at my grandmother's home 
from about April, 2007 through August, 2007. 
My mother had been living at my grandmother's home beginning in about 
April, 2006. 
In about April, 2007, Mike moved into the home as my grandmother's 
foster-care child. He resided there until he was removed from the home and 
my grandmother's license to care for foster children was removed in August, 
2007. 
From April through the present, Mike and my mother have been inseparable. 
They have been and are always together whenever I see them. 
In May, 2007, my mom picked my upon from Smith's in Orem, Utah. When 
she got there, she told me that she had to pick up the boys (my 
grandmother's foster boys). When she stopped to pick up the boys, she told 
me I had to get in the back so Mike could ride up front with her. I thought 
her behavior odd. Her interaction vvith Mike on that trip caused me to 
believe that she had a romantic interest in him. 
At the end of May, 2007, my sister, Lacy, had a birthday party for my niece 
and nephew at a park in Provo, The party was just a family party. As my 
mom was part of the family, she was invited to go to the party. She and 
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Mike arrived together and were together throughout the party, sitting side by 
side, and treating each other as though they were boyfriend and girlfriend. 
They left together. I thought it was strange how my mom was acting around 
Mike. 
9. In August, 2007,1 helped my sister move. She had things in a storage unit 
that she shared with my mom, so we went there to get her stuff. 
10. While I was at the storage unit, I noticed letters sitting on top of a stroller, 
addressed to Becky from Mike. When I later asked my Mom about the 
letters, she appeared embarrassed and defensive. I asked her what was going 
on between her and Mike. She told me it was none of my business. I asked 
her if she knew what would happen if they got caught together. She told me 
she knew what would happen. From that conversation, it was clear to me 
that my mother was having a romantic relationship with Mike. 
11. Several times during the months my mom and Mike lived with my 
grandmother, when I went to visit I was told that my mom was not home, 
and she had gone out with Mike, just the two of them (which was against 
Y.H.A. rules for the foster care. 
12. Also, she would sometimes visit me at my apartment or my sister's house. 
She was always with Mike and not the other foster boys. 
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13. I recently learned that my mom and Mike are continuing to see each other, 
even after Mike was removed from the home and transferred to a new place 
in Salt Lake City. 
DATED this _ day of _ 
MISTY~MYEW 
Affiant ^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this^^day of Iff/irUd hy , 
2008 by MISTY MYERS. 
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UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution j House j Senate | Search 
TitJe/Chapter/Section:; Go To 
Utah Code 
Title 78A Judiciary and Judicial Administration 
Chapter 4 Court of Appeals 
Section 103 Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process 
necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
/ (2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals 
from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-6Q2; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify to 
the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals 
has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative 
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Amended by Chapter 344, 2009 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78A04 010300.ZIP 2,947 Bytes 
<< Previous Section (78A-4-1Q2) Next Section (78A-4-104)» 
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UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home j Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution J House j Senate | Search 
Title/Chapter/Section: i^°M\ 
Utah Code 
Title 30 Husband and Wife 
Chapter 3 Divorce 
Section 5 Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children - Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time ~ Determination of alimony -
Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children -
Division of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time — 
Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every 
decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental 
expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or 
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's 
division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62 A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services, 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial 
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may 
include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody 
of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the 
property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and 
father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other 
Members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child, 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may 
delude in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, 
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under 
Ws chapter, 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made 
" ^  denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the 
Prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not 
EJsserted or defended against in good faith. 
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(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a 
grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or 
parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party 
costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other 
party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by 
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during 
the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As. a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of 
separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial In marriages of short duration, when no children have 
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of 
one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the 
marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been 
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been 
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition 
which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding 
alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the 
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent: spouse of the payor may not be 
considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's 
improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. 
However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume 
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if the party paying alimony is-made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Amended by Chapter 129, 2005 General Session 
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Rule 24. Briefs, 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment 
or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the 
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears, 
immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, 
statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue; the standard 
of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set 
out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the 
citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the 
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts 
relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be 
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be 
a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue 
not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state 
the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief 
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unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a 
table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance 
cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in 
all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as 
part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the 
contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the 
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the 
appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to 
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral 
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and 
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency 
proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person,1 "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the 
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the 
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential 
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner 
and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as 
marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be 
made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or 
rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of 
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or 
portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-
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appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a 
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court 
otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs, No brief shall exceed 50 pages, 
and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in 
the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised 
in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of 
Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-
Appellant 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the 
Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good 
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this 
rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional 
pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven 
days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the 
brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the 
draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to 
an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is 
granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than 
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any 
number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by 
reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to 
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before 
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the 
citations. An original" letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original 
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either 
to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter 
shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 
350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or 
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against 
the offending lawyer. 
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Advisory Committee Notes 
Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re Beesley 
883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987)! 
"To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's 
advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..,, the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced 
at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists."' ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEiDA Cold 
Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original) 
(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). See 
also State ex re!. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782 
P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990). 
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable 
standard of review and citation of supporting authority. 
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Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a district or juvenile 
court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except 
as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time 
allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of, 
appeal does not affect the validity-of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the. appellate 
court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of 
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or 
order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal 
or may join in an appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals 
may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant Individual appeals may be consolidated by 
order of the appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the 
parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the appellant and the 
adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in 
consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original 
proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the 
appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court 
from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice 
of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each party to the 
judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If counsel 
of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name of the party represented by that 
counsel. 
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a 
civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court the filing fee established by 
law. The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal regardless of whether the filing fee 
has been paid. Failure to pay the filing fee within a reasonable time may result in dismissal. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall 
immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a 
statement by the clerk indicating whether the filing fee was paid and whether the cost bond required by 
Rule 6 was filed. Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall 
enter the appeal upon the docket An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the 
trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the 
appellant, such name shall be added to the title. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
The designation of parties is changed to conform to the designation of parties in the federal 
appellate courts. 
The rule is amended to make clear that the mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-appeal" does 
not eliminate liability for payment of the filing and docketing fees. But for the order of filing, the cross-
appellant would have been the appellant and so should be required to pay the established fees. 
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